Public good agreements under the weakest-link technology

Alejandro Caparrós and Michael Finus ()

No 1602, Working Papers from Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC

Abstract: We analyze the formation of public good agreements under the weakest-link technology. Coordination of and cooperation on migration policies, money laundering measures and biodiversity conservation e§orts are prime examples of this technology. Whereas for symmetric players, policy coordination is not necessary, for asymmetric players cooperation matters but fails, in the absence of transfers. In contrast, with an optimal transfer scheme, asymmetry may not be an obstacle but an asset for cooperation, with even the grand coalition being stable. We characterize various types and degrees of asymmetry and relate them to the stability of agreements and associate gains from cooperation.

Keywords: public goods; weakest-link technology; coalition formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology (2020)
Working Paper: Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology (2019)
Working Paper: Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology (2019)
Working Paper: Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology (2016)
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