The Political economy of MGNREGS spending in Andhra Pradesh

Megan Sheahan (), Yanyan Liu (), Christopher Barrett and Sudha Narayanan
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Megan Sheahan: Cornell University

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: Are ostensibly demand-driven public programs less susceptible to political clientelism even when private goods are allocated? We investigate this conjecture using expenditure data at the local level from India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. By focusing on one state where accountability and transparency mechanisms have been employed and implementation efforts have been applauded, we do not find evidence of blatant vote buying before the 2009 election but do find that patronage played a small part in fund distribution after the 2009 election. Indeed most variation in expenditure is explained by the observed needs of potential benficiaries, as the scheme intended.

Keywords: India; political economy; clientelism; project allocation; employment guarantee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H41 H42 H53 H54 I38 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ger and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Economy of MGNREGS Spending in Andhra Pradesh (2014)
Working Paper: The political economy of MGNREGS spending in Andhra Pradesh (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2014-030

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