Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries
Luc Eyraud,
Anita Tuladhar,
Julio Escolano,
Marialuz Moreno Badia and
Juliane Sarnes
No 2012/045, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.
Keywords: WP; government; country; Lagged government debt; Fiscal decentralization; fiscal institutions; fiscal rules; European Union; national government; access to borrowing; authorities' access; central government; expenditure share; government tier; Fiscal federalism; Fiscal stance; General government spending; Eastern Europe; Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2012-02-01
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