On the competitive effects of screening in procurement

Adam Pigoń () and Gyula Seres

No 08/2019, IBS Working Papers from Instytut Badan Strukturalnych

Abstract: Procuring authorities frequently use screening in order to mitigate risky bids. This study estimates the effect of bid screening and litigation on entry and bidding using a unique data set on highway construction procurement auctions in Poland. The market exhibits a screening method that ex post selects eligible offers. We demonstrate with an empirical model that this method disproportionately affects small firms and creates a barrier to entry. Our results suggest that screening increases bids by two channels. First, it directly inates bids as well as decreasing entry. Second, in a competitive market, lower entry also inates bids and prices.

Keywords: Procurement; Auctions; Market Design; Litigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 H57 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-des and nep-ind
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement (2019)
Working Paper: On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement (2019)
Working Paper: On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement (2019)
Working Paper: On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibt:wpaper:wp082019

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