Do Police Make Too Many Arrests? The Effect of Enforcement Pullbacks on Crime
Sungwoo Cho,
Felipe Gonçalves () and
Emily Weisburst ()
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Felipe Gonçalves: UCLA
Emily Weisburst: University of California, Los Angeles
No 14907, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
Do reductions in arrests increase crime? We study line-of-duty deaths of police officers, events that likely impact police behavior through increased fear but are unlikely to directly impact civilian behavior. Officer deaths cause significant short-term reductions in all arrest types, with the largest reductions in arrests for lower-level offenses. In contrast, we find no evidence of an increase in crime or a change in victim reporting through 911 calls. There is also no apparent threshold of arrest decline beyond which crime increases. Our findings suggest that enforcement activity can be reduced at the margin without incurring public safety costs.
Keywords: Ferguson effect; broken windows; deterrence; crime; policing; community trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J15 J18 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 87 pages
Date: 2021-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-law and nep-ure
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