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On the Mechanisms of Ability Peer Effects

Alexandra de Gendre and Nicolas Salamanca

No 13938, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Studying with higher ability peers increases student performance, yet we have little idea why. We exploit random assignment of students to classrooms and find positive peer effects on test scores. With rich data on nineteen potential mechanisms, we then estimate how effects on attitudes, parents, and teachers could drive these results. Higher-achieving peers reduce student effort, increase student university aspirations, increase parental time investments and parental strictness, and have precise null effects elsewhere. None of these mechanisms, however, explain our peer effect on test scores. Our results highlight promising avenues for understanding ability peer effects.

Keywords: random assignment; standardized test; parental investments; school inputs; mediation analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 I23 I26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 96 pages
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-net and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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