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Incentives from Curriculum Tracking: Cross-national and UK Evidence

Kristian Koerselman

No 3/2011, Working Paper Series from Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research

Abstract: Curriculum tracking creates incentives before its start, and we should expect scores in tested subjects to be higher at that point. I find evidence from both UK and international data for sizable incentive effects. Incentive effects are important from a methodological perspective because they lead to downward bias in value-added estimates of the later age effect of tracking on achievement. They also invalidate placebo tests that work by regressing pre-tracking scores on tracking policies.

Keywords: incentives; curriculum tracking; ability streaming; high-stakes testing; student achievement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I28 J08 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2011-02-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
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