Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation

Karine Nyborg, Richard Howarth () and Kjell Arne Brekke

No 31/2003, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: “Green” consumers appear to accept individual responsibility for public good provision. The propensity to take such responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions. This can produce multiple equilibria, with either high or low demand for “green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved through permanent or temporary taxes, or through advertising that temporarily influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.

Keywords: Moral motivation; multiple Nash equilibria; green taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D11 H41 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2003-08-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Resource and Energy Economics, 2006, pages 351-366.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpubli ... 003/Memo-31-2003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:osloec:2003_031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mari Strønstad Øverås ().