Strategy-Proofness, Core, and Sequential Trade

Lars-Gunnar Svensson and Bo Larsson ()

No 2002:14, Working Papers from Lund University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model - where a finite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a finite number of individuals - to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred (objects inherited) as the allocation process unfolds, under the retained assumption that an individual consumes at most one object. In this environment we analyze the core of the economy and characterize the set of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms. From a dual perspective, we consider property rights implicitly defined by a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism and show a core property for the mechanism-induced endowment rule.

Keywords: Strategy-proof; core; housing market; sequential trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2002-02-04, Revised 2003-05-09
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Published in Review of Economic Design, 2005, pages 167-190.

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Journal Article: Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade (2005)
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