Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria

No 737, Working Paper Series from Research Institute of Industrial Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a survey of the literature on property rights and economic growth. It discusses different theoretical mechanisms that relate property rights to economic development. Lack of protection of property rights can result in slow economic growth through different channels: expropriation of private wealth, corruption of civil servants, excessive taxation and barriers to adoption of new technologies. The origins of property rights are also considered. Different theories are illustrated but more attention is paid to the “social conflict view” and its strengths and limitations. The second part of the paper illustrates relevant empirical works on property rights and growth.

Keywords: Institutions; Economic Development; Property Rights; Social Conflict View (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O11 O12 O43 P14 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2008-03-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0737

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