Harsanyi's aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences

Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos and Jean-Marc Tallon
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Thibault Gajdos: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinement of the representation.

Keywords: Incomplete preferences; aggregation; expected multi-utility; utilitarianism; Préférences incomplètes; agrégation; utilitarisme (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00941799
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in 2014

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00941799

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