Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise ? Comprendre la décision de la banque

Abstract: Banks have to choose between debt re-negotiation and liquidation of their financially distressed corporate debtors. We review different models to identify key determinants of their choice. The literature on the resolution of financial distress shows that the banks' decision is based on the financial and economic characteristics of the distressed firms. If information is asymmetric, incentive considerations induce banks to be severe. However, if banks own (or are supposed to own) information that other stakeholders do not have, banks may help their debtors in an opportunistic way.

Keywords: corporate bankruptcy; bank relationships; asymmetric information; moral hazard; faillite d'entreprises; relation banque-entreprise; asymétrie d'information; aléa moral. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01391665
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Published in Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 2005, 8 (1), pp.131 - 157

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Journal Article: Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise? Comprendre la décision de la banque (2005)
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