Price Signaling and Quality Monitoring in Markets for Credence Goods

Philippe Mahenc and Alexandre Volle ()
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Philippe Mahenc: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement
Alexandre Volle: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro

Abstract: We explore the interplay between price signaling and independent monitoring for communicating information about the credence attribute of a good, such as environmental quality. We augment the standard model of price signaling allowing consumers to use the results of noisy monitoring as a complementary source of information. We show that monitoring restores the credibility of price signaling by saving partly or fully the signaling cost borne by green rms to deter cheating. A key reason for this is that monitoring compensates for the lack of information resulting from arbitrary beliefs based on surprising prices. The more accurate monitoring, the cheaper price signaling. The signaling behavior of green rms also depends on their number. We determine which proportion of rms choose to improve environmental quality.

Keywords: credence good; fraud; monitoring; signaling. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-env
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