Rich Mines, Poor Institutions: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia

Paolo Buonanno, Ruben Durante () and Giovanni Prarolo
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Ruben Durante: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Under weak law-enforcement institutions, a positive shock to the value of natural resources can increase demand for private protection and opportunities for rent appropriation through extortion, ultimately favoring the emergence of mafia-type organizations specialized in such activities. Using a newly collected municipal level dataset, we test this hypothesis by investigating mafia's emergence in XIX century Sicily, where a severe lack of state property-right enforcement coincided with a steep rise in international demand for sulfur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity. Consistently with this hypothesis, we find robust evidence of significantly higher early mafia activity in municipalities with greater sulfur availability.

Keywords: Resource Curse; Weak Institutions; Mafia-type Organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03460966
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Rich Mines, Poor Institutions: Resource Curse and the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia (2013)
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