Nudging farmers to sign agri-environmental contracts: the effects of a collective bonus

Laure Kuhfuss, Raphaële Préget (), Sophie Thoyer () and Nick Hanley

Abstract: Using a choice experiment, this paper shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers' participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid per hectare of enrolled land in addition to the usual agri-environmental payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of farmers' participation in the region or catchment of interest. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of wine growers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others' participation, therefore changing the pro-environmental social norm and initiating group dynamics towards the adoption of less pesticide- intensive farming practices over time.

Keywords: choice experiment; behaviour; collective incentive; payment for environmental services; social norm; agri-environmental schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dcm, nep-env and nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01148581v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Nudging farmers to sign agri-environmental contracts: the effects of a collective bonus (2015)
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