Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation

Domenico Colucci, Nicola Doni () and Vincenzo Valori

No 2012-06, Working Papers - Mathematical Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: We study a model of procurement auctions in which information policies can be used to treat two heterogeneous suppliers asymmetrically. The buyer is shown to be better off revealing information about her preferences to the weak supplier only, when there is a sufficient cost difference between the weak and the strong. Conversely, when the two competitors have similar cost structures, for the buyer it is best to disclose her preferences publicly.

Keywords: procurement; information revelation; discriminatory policy; asymmetric auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Economics Letters

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.disei.unifi.it/upload/sub/pubblicazioni ... 2/dimadwp2012-06.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:flo:wpaper:2012-06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers - Mathematical Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa Via delle Pandette 9 50127 - Firenze - Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michele Gori ().