Tax Morale and Optimal Taxation

Werner Gueth () and Rupert Sausgruber
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distorsion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific commodity tax. This tax cannot be evaded but distorts optimal consumption choices, instead. The result is that a large majority of subjects prefer the general income tax regime. The bulk of votes is consistent with actual payoffs. We isolate tax morale as cause for payoffs above theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Optimal taxation; tax evasion; voting experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H21 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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