One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime

Quoc-Anh Do, Kieu-Trang Nguyen and Anh N. Tran

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

JEL-codes: J1 N0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol, nep-sea, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

Published in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1, October, 2017, 9(4), pp. 1-29. ISSN: 1945-7782

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http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85928/ Open access version. (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2016)
Working Paper: One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2016)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
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