The effect of third party intervention in the trust game

Marina Fiedler and Ernan Haruvy

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2017, vol. 67, issue C, 65-74

Abstract: The literature suggests that in the trust game setting a third party may have an impact on trust and trustworthiness. This may be done through monitoring alone, as well as through punishment or reward. We examine the impact of these three factors in both fixed and random partner settings. We find evidence that third party intervention is sensitive to participant actions and can result in changes in investment and return behavior, although not necessarily in the intended direction. Despite this individual impact, adding punishment or reward capabilities to the third party monitor has no significant effect in the aggregate. The increase in contributions in the presence of a third party can primarily be attributed to third party monitoring.

Keywords: Trust game; Investment game; Punishment; Reward; Reinforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 C99 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:67:y:2017:i:c:p:65-74

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.10.003

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