Dynamic repeated random dictatorship and gender discrimination

Dennis Dittrich, Susanne Büchner and Micaela M. Kulesz

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2015, vol. 55, issue C, 81-90

Abstract: To reduce the cognitive experimenter demand effect we embed a dictator game in a more complex decision environment, a dynamic household savings decision problem, thus rendering the dictator decision to share some endowment less salient. We then use this game in a laboratory experiment to investigate gender specific allocation behaviour and discrimination. We observe that dictators treat females nicer than males independent of their own gender. Participants are not aware of their discriminating behaviour.

Keywords: Repeated dictator game; Altruistic preferences; Gender discrimination; Non-deceptive obfuscation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Working Paper: Dynamic Repeated Random Dictatorship and Gender Discrimination (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:55:y:2015:i:c:p:81-90

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2015.02.001

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