Why do spouses hide income?

Hazel Jean Malapit

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2012, vol. 41, issue 5, 584-593

Abstract: This paper proposes a simplified model of intrahousehold decision making where cooperative and noncooperative behavior are not mutually exclusive. Individuals choose the optimal share of income they wish to devote towards cooperation, where income is pooled and allocated collectively, and towards noncooperation, where income is allocated independently. Using the example of joint saving as an area of household cooperation, this model shows how limited autonomy and bargaining power can interact to create incentives for individuals to hide income. This result provides theoretical support for the call to collect survey data separately from individuals rather than from household representatives.

Keywords: Intrahousehold allocation; Income pooling; Saving; Bargaining power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D14 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:41:y:2012:i:5:p:584-593

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2012.04.007

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