Conference calls around merger and acquisition announcements: Do they reduce information asymmetry? UK EvidenceGeorgia Siougle, Spyros Spyrou and Andrianos Tsekrekos Research in International Business and Finance, 2014, vol. 30, issue C, 148-172 Abstract: This paper examines conference call meetings held around merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements in the UK market. Our main findings indicate that conference calls not only facilitate the smoother transmission of M&A-related information in the stock market and smooth the rate of the information flow to the market, but also they reduce informed trading through option markets before M&A events. We also find that there is an inverse relation of analysts’ forecast error and conference call probability, that firms initiate conference calls during M&As when their transactions are large and are facing liquidity constraints, and that the probability of a firm holding a conference call around an M&A is strongly and inversely related to the existence of traded equity options on its stock. Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; Conference calls; Asymmetric information; Option markets; Corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:30:y:2014:i:c:p:148-172 DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2013.07.003 Access Statistics for this article Research in International Business and Finance is currently edited by T. Lagoarde Segot More articles in Research in International Business and Finance from Elsevier |
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