The comparative and interactive effects of political, academic and financial directors

Yu Liu

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2020, vol. 70, issue C, 546-565

Abstract: This study considers directors with political, academic, or financial (PAF) backgrounds and examines their comparative strengths/weaknesses and their interactive effects. Academic directors are associated with better firm performance, stronger monitoring effects, enhanced innovation results, and easier access to finance. Political and financial directors are likely selected for their resource-providing capacity. The relationship between PAF directors and firm activities varies systematically across industries and over time. More importantly, PAF directors are not independent from one another. A significant presence of political directors weakens the monitoring and performance effects of academic directors.

Keywords: Political directors; Academic directors; Financial directors; Firm performance; Monitoring; Advising; Resource providing; Interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G32 G34 L25 O30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:70:y:2020:i:c:p:546-565

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2020.08.003

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