Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018, vol. 93, issue C, 132-140

Abstract: We introduce the class of tree TU-games augmented by a linear order over the links, which reflects the formation process of the tree. We characterize a new allocation rule for this class of cooperative games by means of three axioms: Standardness, Top consistency and Link amalgamation. Then, we discuss both a bargaining foundation and two possible extensions for this allocation rule.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489618300209
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:93:y:2018:i:c:p:132-140

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.003

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Social Sciences is currently edited by J.-F. Laslier

More articles in Mathematical Social Sciences from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().