Politics, risk, and white elephants in infrastructure PPPs

Daniel Albalate, Germà Bel and Albert Gragera

Utilities Policy, 2019, vol. 58, issue C, 158-165

Abstract: Theoretical research on cooperation between public and private partners in infrastructure projects suggests that they can be a tool for preventing white elephants. However, various case studies suggest that actual outcomes are largely dependent on the effective transfer of operational risk to the private partner. This paper explores policy and planning dysfunction, and the idea that private entities that participate in public-private partnerships (PPPs) with no substantial risk transfer, and under heavily subsidized schemes, may engage in lobbying and exert pressure to develop white elephant projects.

Keywords: PPP; Political favoritism; Infrastructure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:58:y:2019:i:c:p:158-165

DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2019.05.001

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