What is the price of prevention? New evidence from a field experiment
Edward N. Okeke,
Clement A. Adepiti and
Kayode O. Ajenifuja
Journal of Health Economics, 2013, vol. 32, issue 1, 207-218
Abstract:
How does increasing access to treatment affect the demand for preventive testing? In this paper we present results from a field experiment in Nigeria in which we offered cervical cancer screening to women at randomly chosen prices. To test our hypothesis, we also offered women a lottery where the payoff was a subsidy towards the cost of cervical cancer treatment (conditional upon a diagnosis of cervical cancer). We find that women randomly selected to receive the conditional cancer treatment subsidy were about 4 percentage points more likely to take up screening than those in the control group. We also show that reducing the price of screening by 10 cents increased take-up by about 1 percentage point. These results offer compelling evidence that the optimal set of subsidies to increase take-up of preventive testing in developing countries, must include subsidies towards treatment costs (in addition to price subsidies).
Keywords: Randomized experiment; Prices; Demand; Prevention; Testing; Subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D01 D03 I12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629612001543
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:1:p:207-218
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.10.001
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Health Economics is currently edited by J. P. Newhouse, A. J. Culyer, R. Frank, K. Claxton and T. McGuire
More articles in Journal of Health Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().