Motivation, money, prestige and cheats

David Pascual-Ezama, Drazen Prelec and Derek Dunfield

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 93, issue C, 367-373

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of supervision and incentives on subjects’ performance and cheating behavior in a real effort task. With a sample of 540 participants in three different experiments, we investigated the interaction between motivation and monetary and social rewards, with and without supervision. Our results suggest: (1) lack of supervision promotes cheating, though workers tend to cheat moderately; (2) both economic and social incentives increase motivation but only when workers like their jobs; (3) workers do not increase their band of acceptable dishonest behavior for possible economic rewards, but they do increase dishonest behavior for possible social rewards, like prestige.

Keywords: Labor supply supervision; Dishonesty behavior; Economic and social motivation; Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 J01 J30 M50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:367-373

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.015

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