CEOs’ power and perks: Evidence from Chinese banks

Hsiu-I Ting and Po-Kai Huang

Journal of Economics and Business, 2018, vol. 97, issue C, 19-27

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the relation between CEOs’ power and their perks in Chinese banks over the period from 1999 to 2011 period. We find that banks with more powerful CEOs, as measured by the CEO as the only insider and the CEO’s directorships, provide greater perks. This finding could be explained by social needs and monitoring difficulties but not by entrenchment. Powerful CEOs tend to maintain connections or “guanxi” by building political ties and attending more business entertainment activities. They also have lower pay-performance sensitivity. Only a gender-diverse board provides better monitoring to reduce perks.

Keywords: Perquisites; CEO power; Entrenchment; Social need; Gender-diverse board (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G21 G30 G34 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:97:y:2018:i:c:p:19-27

DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2018.02.003

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