Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan

International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2009, vol. 27, issue 2, 137-144

Abstract: It is known that bid rigging in public-work auctions in Japan often takes the form of exchanging favors. In such a scheme, the winner is designated based on favors he has given to other ring members. By explicitly modeling "favor" as an explanatory variable, this paper analyzes data from the public-works auctions for consulting works in Naha, Japan, to confirm that such a collusion scheme is in operation.

Keywords: Bid; rigging; Collusion; Repeated; auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:2:p:137-144

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