Property Rights and Invention

Chapter Chapter 7 in Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, 2010, vol. 1, pp 315-380 from Elsevier

Abstract: We present a selective survey of the economic theory of intellectual property rights. After a brief description of the institutional framework, we discuss policy objectives and some basic welfare tradeoffs in intellectual property design. We consider the extent to which social objectives can be attained without intellectual property protection before passing on to intellectual property right design. We derive conclusions in the simplest, one-time innovation, case then investigate how these conclusions change when innovations build on each other or fit together as complements. Modifications of existing protection and optimal procurement of innovation are considered. Finally, we sketch enforcement and competition policy issues.

Keywords: incentives; innovation; intellectual property rights; patents; procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H41 K11 L51 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Working Paper: Property Rights and Invention (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:haechp:v1_315

DOI: 10.1016/S0169-7218(10)01007-5

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