An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon and Takashi Yamada

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 88-104

Abstract: We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.

Keywords: Nash program; Bargaining procedures; Shapley value; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: An Experiment on The Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value (2023)
Working Paper: An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:88-104

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010

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