Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networksGames and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 133, issue C, 230-247 Abstract: I consider environments where communication networks are endogenous, but monitoring rules enforce agents to ask consent from others to form new links or break their existing links. A monitoring rule consists of a number x and a collection of groups O such that each agent requires consent from x number of agents in every group she belongs to. First, I show that efficient networks can have at most one component when externalities are positive, whereas they can have multiple components when externalities are negative. Second, I find that partitioning set of agents into groups based on components of the efficient network forms “smallest groups” that can internalize all of externalities; therefore, they can stabilize the efficient network with minimum number of monitors. I relate this finding to the widespread adoption of “small work groups with few monitors” (like Quality Circles) by quality management programs to enhance communication between developers. Keywords: Communication networks; Organizations; Externalities; Consents (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:230-247 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.004 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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