Self-selection in school choiceLi Chen and Juan Sebastián Pereyra Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 117, issue C, 59-81 Abstract: We study self-selection in centralized school choice, a strategy that takes place when students submit preferences before knowing their priorities at schools. A student self-selects if she decides not to apply to some schools despite being desirable. We give a theoretical explanation for this behavior: if a student believes her chances of being assigned to some schools are zero, she may not rank them even when the mechanism is strategyproof. Using data from the Mexico City high school match, we find evidence that self-selection exists and exposes students especially from low socio-economic backgrounds to strategic mistakes. Correcting these mistakes leads to an increase in participation of students from low socio-economic backgrounds. These findings question the effectiveness of equal access provided by school choice, and we argue it can be improved by changing the timing of submission. Keywords: School choice; Incomplete information; Self-selection; Serial dictatorship mechanism; Strategyproofness (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:59-81 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.06.004 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
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