Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration

Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, vol. 104, issue C, 517-534

Abstract: The ability to form shared intentions and adjust one's choices in collaboration with others is a fundamental aspect of human nature. We discuss the forces that act for and against the evolution of this ability. In contrast to altruism and other non-fitness maximizing preferences, for large classes of games the ability to form shared intentions proliferates when rare without requiring group selection or assortativity in matching.

Keywords: Shared intentions; Collaboration; Evolution; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Working Paper: Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:104:y:2017:i:c:p:517-534

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.001

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