Identifying subjective beliefs in subjective state space models

Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, vol. 95, issue C, 59-72

Abstract: This paper takes the Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) framework, in which subjective beliefs over subjective states cannot be identified, and proves a conjecture made in their paper: if the Bernoulli utility functions are additively separable and one of the terms is state-independent, then beliefs are uniquely identified. The main departure from existing literature is that beliefs are identified without imposing extra objective elements into the model.

Keywords: Subjective states; Menu choice; Decision theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D11 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:95:y:2016:i:c:p:59-72

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.007

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