Are we underestimating inequality aversion? Comparing recruited and classroom subjects

Linda Kamas and Anne Preston

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 147, issue C, 157-159

Abstract: This paper finds that in experiments measuring social preferences, subjects who respond to recruitment incentivized by pecuniary rewards are more likely to be self-interested and less likely to be inequality averse than students who participate in classroom sessions.

Keywords: Social preferences; Inequality aversion; Experimental methodology; Selection bias; Dictator game; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:157-159

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.037

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