Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: The unassigned-offeror problem

Claudia Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 3, 390-394

Abstract: Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.

Keywords: Business deadlock; Shotgun mechanisms; Asymmetric information; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D82 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:3:p:390-394

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.09.016

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