Fighting corruption: To precommit or not?

Fabien Ngendakuriyo () and Georges Zaccour

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 149-154

Abstract: We consider a differential game with a corrupt government and civil society as its players. We characterize open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria and find that, whereas it is in the best interest of the government not to commit to a repression policy, civil society is better off precommitting to fight corruption.

Keywords: Corruption; Differential games; Commitments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 H8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:149-154

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.025

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