Learning, bounded memory, and inertia

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 101, issue 2, 134-136

Abstract: This paper considers bounded-memory players in a coordination game, who imitate the most successful remembered actions. With exogenous inertia, risk-dominant equilibria are selected independently of the length of memory. Without inertia, Pareto-dominant equilibria arise when memory is long enough.

Keywords: Imitation; Inertia; Learning; Memory; Mutations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(08)00192-4
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:134-136

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().