The GATT and Gradualism

Benjamin Zissimos and Ben Lockwood

No 607, Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Free trade can never be achieved if punishment for deviation from a trade agreement is limited to a 'withdrawal of equivalent concessions.' Trade liberalization must be gradual if, in addition, deviation from an agreement is limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries may have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures

Keywords: Nash tariffs; Free Trade; Gradualism; Trade agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://repec.org/esNASM04/up.6995.1075611734.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The GATT and gradualism (2007)
Working Paper: The GATT and Gradualism (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:nasm04:607

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