Industry Effects on the Use of Board and Institutional Investor Monitoring and Executive Incentive Compensation
Yasemin Y. Kor,
Sharon Watson and
Joseph T. Mahoney
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Yasemin Y. Kor: U of Delaware
Sharon Watson: U of Delaware
Joseph T. Mahoney: U of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Working Papers from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business
Abstract:
This paper develops and empirically tests a theory of the use of board and institutional investor monitoring and the use of executive incentive compensation under different types of uncertainty in the industry. This empirical examination is based on a sample of U.S. firms operating in a wide range of industries. Practical implications derived from this paper direct the attention of both shareholders and governance specialists to critical tradeoffs involved in the use of specific governance mechanisms under demand, competitive, and technological uncertainty.
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:illbus:04-0108
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