Off Pitch: Football's Financial Integrity Weaknesses, and How to Strengthen Them
Matt Andrews and
Peter Harrington
Additional contact information
Matt Andrews: Harvard University
Peter Harrington: Harvard University
Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government
Abstract:
Men's professional football is the biggest sport in the world, producing (by our estimate) US $33 billion a year. All is not well in the sector, however, with regular scandals raising questions about the role of money in the sport. The 2015 turmoil around FIFA is obviously the most well known example, creating a crisis in confidence in the sector. This study examines these questions, and the financial integrity weaknesses they reveal; it also offers ideas to strengthen the weaknesses. The study argues that football's financial integrity weaknesses extend far beyond FIFA. These weaknesses have emerged largely because the sector is dominated by a small elite of clubs, players and owners centered in Europe's top leagues. The thousands of clubs beyond this elite have very little resources, constituting a vast base of 'have-nots' in football's financial pyramid. This pyramid developed in recent decades, fuelled by concentrated growth in new revenue sources (like sponsorships, and broadcasting). The growth has also led to increasingly complex transactions--in player transfers, club ownership and financing (and more)--and an expansion in opportunities for illicit practices like match-fixing, money laundering and human trafficking. We argue that football's governing bodies--including FIFA--helped establish this pyramid. We explore the structural weaknesses of this pyramid by looking at five pillars of financial integrity (using data drawn from UEFA, FIFA, clubs, primary research, and interviews). In the first pillar of Financial Transparency and Literacy we find that a vast majority of the world's clubs and governing bodies publish no financial data, leaving a vast dark space with no transparency. In the second pillar of Financial Sustainability we estimate that a majority of global clubs and governing bodies are at 'medium to high risk' of financial failure. We find, additionally, that European tax debts have grown despite Financial Fair Play, and confederations and FIFA contribute to a pattern of weak Fiscal Responsibility. We then create a new metric of Financial Concentration and find that the football sector is at 'high risk' of over-concentration, which poses existential questions for many clubs and even leagues. In the final pillar of Social Responsibility and Moral Reputation, we find that football's governing bodies face a crisis of legitimacy stemming from a failure to tackle moral turpitude, set standards and regulate effectively. We suggest a set of reforms to re-structure FIFA in particular, separating its functions and stressing its regulatory role.
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1309
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:16-009
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().