Cartels and asymmetric cost pass-through: evidence from Brazilian gas stations

Economics Bulletin, 2022, vol. 42, issue 4, 2034 - 2042

Abstract: I analyse if collusive agreements are responsible for asymmetric cost pass-through in the Brazilian retail gasoline market. I find that, overall, Brazilian stations do not present asymmetric cost pass-through. However, this phenomenon is observed in stations that belong to a cartel. This different behavior is due to cartelised stations increasing their price more than non-cartelised ones when faced by increases in costs.

Keywords: cartels; asymmetric price transmission; gasoline market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12-30
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