Social Security in Germany: A Prey of Political Opportunism?

No 677, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper examines how politicians influenced social security policy in Germany. Using yearly data from the German Pension Insurance from 1957 to 2005, revenues as well as expenditures are analysed in linear regression models, respectively. In accordance with opportunistic political behaviour, revenues from contributions decreased in pre-election years. Most important, pension expenditures increased in election years. Interestingly, the CDU/FDP governments provided higher subsidies to the social security system than the grand coalition and the SPD/GR government. Overall, there is no evidence for the prospect, that left coalitions caused higher intergenerational redistribution than right governments.

Keywords: social security; partisan politics; pension system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 p.
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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