Competition, Equity and Quality in HealthCare
Carol Propper and
Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka
No 9325, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
In this paper we focus on the implications of consumer heterogeneity for whether competition will improve outcomes in health care markets. We show that competition generally favours the majority group as higher quality for the majority is an effective way to increase the quality signal and attract patients. A regulator who is concerned about equity may protect the minority group by not introducing competition. Alternatively, if the minority group is favoured by the providers under monopoly, competition can improve equity by forcing the providers to increase quality for the majority group.
Keywords: Hospitals; Competition; Quality; Equity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H11 I11 I14 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hea and nep-ias
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Working Paper: Competition, Equity and Quality in Health Care (2012)
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