Financial liberalization and democracy: The role of reform reversals
Fabrizio Coricelli and
Nauro Campos
No 7393, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
The relationship between economic and political liberalization has received a great deal of attention lately, yet the possibility of a non-linear relationship and the role of reversals remain largely neglected. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, this paper offers evidence for a U-shaped relationship across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting using a wide range of estimators for various reform measures. We link this non-linear relationship to the notion of partial or captured democracy. We provide as well econometric support showing that even when de facto is modelled as a function of de jure financial liberalization, this non-linearity obtains.
Keywords: Economic liberalization; Financial reform; Political liberalization; Reform reversals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 O38 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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Working Paper: Financial Liberalization and Democracy: The Role of Reform Reversals (2009)
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