Who Wants To Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions

Irina Denisova, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Timothy Frye and Markus Eller

No 7260, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Using survey data from 28 transition countries, we test for the complementarity and substitutability of market-relevant skills and institutions. We show that democracy and good governance complement market skills in transition economies. Under autocracy and weak governance institutions there is no significant difference in support for revising privatization between high and low-skilled respondents. As the level of democracy and the quality of governance increases, the difference in the level of support for revising privatization between the high and low skilled grows dramatically. This finding contributes to our understanding of microfoundations of the politics of economic reform.

Keywords: Complementarity; Perception; Privatization; Skills; Transition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J2 O0 P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Journal Article: Who Wants To Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions (2009)
Working Paper: Who Wants To Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions (2009)
Working Paper: Who Wants To Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions (2009)
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