Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools

Jo Seldeslachts, Pedro Barros and Joseph Clougherty

No 6437, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policymakers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools, as they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of different antitrust actions ? Prohibitions, Remedies, and Monitorings ? to deter firms from engaging in mergers. We employ cross-jurisdiction/pan-time data on merger policy to empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future merger frequencies. We find merger prohibitions to lead to decreased merger notifications in subsequent periods, and remedies to weakly increase future merger notifications: in other words, prohibitions involve a deterrence effect but remedies do not.

Keywords: Deterrence; Merger policy; Remedies; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L40 L49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools (2007)
Working Paper: Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools (2007)
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