Electoral Systems, Taxation and Immigration Policies: Which System Builds a Wall first?

Massimo Morelli () and Margherita Negri

No 12212, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: When exposed to similar migration flows, countries with different institutional systems may respond with different levels of openness. We study in particular the different responses determined by different electoral systems. We find that Winner Take All countries would tend to be more open than countries with PR when all other policies are kept constant, but, crucially, if we consider the endogenous differences in redistribution levels across systems, then the openness ranking may switch.

Keywords: Proportional representation; Median voter; Taxation; Occupational choice; Migration; Walls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-mig and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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