Weapons of Choice

Axel Dreher and Merle Kreibaum

No 10082, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We investigate the effect of natural resources on whether ethno-political groups choose to pursue their goals with peaceful as compared to violent means, distinguishing terrorism from insurgencies. We hypothesize that organizations are more likely to resort to terrorism rather than rebellion in richer countries where population mobilization is more difficult. We use data from the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) project, covering 118 organizations in 13 countries of the Middle East and North Africa over the 1980-2004 period. Our multinomial logit models combine group- and country-specific information and show that ethno-political groups are more likely to resort to rebellion rather than using peaceful means or becoming terrorists when representing regions rich in oil. Groups that participate in exerting power over their region are less likely to turn to large-scale violence.

Keywords: Oil; Rebellion; Resource curse; Terrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cdm, nep-ene and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Weapons of choice (2016)
Working Paper: Weapons of Choice (2015)
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